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Emergency department personnel must be constantly 
aware of the risk of exposure to a patient with a 
communicable viral haemorrhagic fever (VHF). This 
requires that they are familiar with the symptoms and 
signs of this group of formidable diseases and that 
they should also be aware of geographical regions where VHFs are 
endemic or, as has lately been the case, epidemic. The subsequent care 
of a patient with a suspected or proven VHF requires strict attention 
to infection control and access to appropriate personal protective 
equipment (PPE). The following case reports illustrate the possibility of 
exposure in South Africa (SA) and highlight the potential for loss of life 
if these diseases are not recognised or infection control is inadequate.
Case reports
Marburg virus, 1975
The first documented case of Marburg virus in Africa, and the first 
since the original epidemic in West Germany and Yugoslavia in 
1967, occurred in Johannesburg in February 1975.[1,2] The primary 
case, a young Australian, was admitted to Johannesburg Hospital 
(JH) after having toured what was then Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe). 
He had a high fever, myalgia, vomiting, diarrhoea, a maculopapular 
rash, hepatitis, leucopenia and thrombocytopenia, and died on the 
7th day after presentation without a diagnosis, from disseminated 
intravascular coagulation (DIC)-related haemorrhage and hepatic 
failure. Because a VHF was suspected and appropriate infection 
control practices had not initially been observed, all 35 direct 
contacts were isolated in the Johannesburg Fever Hospital (JFH), and 
all less close contacts kept under daily surveillance.
The travelling companion of the first patient subsequently became 
ill with similar symptoms, and was also admitted to JFH. She 
recovered after 10 days following a stormy course, having been cared 
for by volunteers from among the staff who had been placed in 
isolation. Eight days later, a 20-year-old nurse who had cared for the 
first patient before initiation of appropriate barrier nursing, and had 
in addition handled wet facial tissues while consoling patient 2 on the 
death of her travelling companion, also became ill. She continued to 
work at JFH, only stopping 24 hours later when symptoms became 
intolerable. Over the next 2 days she developed diarrhoea, fever, 
backache, myalgia, a rash and hepatitis. By day 7 she fortunately 
began to improve and was later discharged. The travelling companion 
could have contracted the disease prior to admission to hospital, and 
the nurse, although having had unprotected contact, had no more 
contact than many others.
Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever
On 28 August 1984, a 26-year-old man presented to a hospital near 
Cape Town, with haemorrhagic manifestations.[3] He was subsequently 
transferred to an intensive care unit (ICU) in an academic hospital, 
where he died from multiple organ dysfunction on 4 September. 
The diagnosis was confirmed by isolation of the Crimean-Congo 
haemorrhagic fever (CCHF) virus from admission bloods, and from 
liver tissue removed post mortem. This was prior to the availability 
of identification techniques utilising the polymerase chain reaction 
(PCR), and initially no antibodies were detected. Seven healthcare 
workers (HCWs) subsequently became ill with CCHF, primarily 
because stringent isolation procedures were instituted only 36 hours 
after admission of the index patient, and initially numerous blood 
specimens were handled in the laboratory without precautions. The 
first three were nurses who had cared for the index patient during his 
first few hours in the ICU; two other nurses came into contact with 
contaminated material during the setting up of isolation procedures; 
a 37-year-old surgeon without known direct contact with the index 
patient but who had visited the ICU before isolation fell ill following 
an incubation period of 5 days and died 8 days later (the virus was 
subsequently isolated from his blood); and a nurse had a needlestick 
injury after initiation of contact precautions.[4] Once appropriate 
infection control with isolation had been introduced, the latter was 
the only infection that occurred.
Recent events in West Africa have highlighted the potential for the viral haemorrhagic fevers (VHFs) to cause considerable mortality and 
morbidity among heathcare workers. However, this is not a new threat as, although the risk is currently increased, it has always been present. 
In South Africa (SA) the only endemic haemorrhagic fever is Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever, transmitted by the Hyalomma tick, 
which is ubiquitous in cattle farming areas. Johannesburg, the commercial and transport hub of SA, is unusual in that all cases of VHF seen 
there are imported, either from rural areas in SA or from countries to the north. Johannesburg functions as the gateway to and from the 
rest of Africa, and as a destination for more affluent residents of neighbouring countries seeking medical attention. Numerous outbreaks of 
nosocomial infection have occurred in SA, and these are described in the form of brief case reports.
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In December 1985, a 47-year-old nurse at Kimberley Hospital died 
of CCHF. She had been caring for a 52-year-old man from the 
Kimberley area who had contracted CCHF by tick bite. This patient 
survived. There are few further details available about this incident 
(personal communication, Jacqueline Weyers, National Institute of 
Communicable Diseases, SA).
On 4 April 2006, a 24-year-old employed in a private pathology 
laboratory was admitted to the JH ICU with a 2-day history of an 
influenza-like illness (unpublished data, GAR). The only clinical 
abnormality was a platelet count of 7 × 109/L. He had no travel 
history, no tick bites and no contact with animals. However, the 
laboratory in which he worked had processed specimens from an 
importer of birds and monkeys from the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo who had died on 1 April from an unidentified haemorrhagic 
illness. This patient had also been fishing in KwaZulu-Natal Province 
on 15 March, where he had been bitten by ticks; however, the PCR 
had been negative for VHFs. The laboratory worker had been on 
duty from 28 to 31 April. It was subsequently established that he 
had sorted through and repacked other specimens into the same 
refrigerator in which those from the first patient were stored (as had 
others in the laboratory), but there was no record of any specific 
exposure. He was tested for VHFs, all of which were negative, as 
were tests for other infectious diseases. However, barrier nursing 
procedures were maintained throughout. He was unresponsive to 
any form of therapy, and 3 days after admission he was intubated 
and mechanically ventilated after developing a large spontaneous 
hemopneumothorax. Twelve days after admission, repeat PCR for 
CCHF tested positive. Treatment with ribavirin was commenced 
when he developed a refractory hyperpyrexia of 41oC, but he died 
shortly thereafter.
PCR tests are not always reliable initially, and VHFs should be 
considered in any HCW, including laboratory workers presenting 
with haemorrhagic manifestations. If an alternative diagnosis is not 
established, barrier precautions should be continued until a VHF is 
excluded. In this instance, no further transmission to staff members 
at JH occurred.
Ebola Gabon virus 
In 1996 - 1997 an outbreak of Ebola virus disease (EVD) occurred in 
the Booué area of Gabon, with many patients subsequently transported 
to the capital, Libreville.[5] This distant incident later impacted on 
SA.[6] On 2 November 1996, a 46-year-old nursing sister/anaesthetic 
assistant became ill with fever and headache, requiring admission 
to a Johannesburg clinic on the 6th. She had no history of travel or 
insect bites, and as far as she was aware had not treated anyone with a 
communicable disease. The diagnosis was unclear, but because there 
was leucopenia (2.4 × 109/L on admission, decreasing to 0.8 × 109/L by 
9 November) she was treated as having bacteraemia. She subsequently 
developed hepatitis and severe diarrhoea, and both the platelet 
count and renal function declined precipitously. Prior to definitive 
diagnosis, she developed haematemesis and melaena requiring active 
resuscitation, gastroscopy, intubation and mechanical ventilation. These 
were performed without precautions other than surgical masks, gloves, 
plastic aprons and in some cases permeable surgical gowns. When the 
bleeding continued, laparotomy was performed using standard surgical 
apparel, which confirmed an oedematous, haemorrhagic gastritis for 
which surgical intervention was not possible. The clinical features led 
to the suspicion of a VHF, and diagnostic investigations later confirmed 
the diagnosis of EVD by culture and immunofluorescence (again prior 
to the availability of PCR testing).
The patient was transferred to JH and the Department of Health 
was involved in logistical aspects. At JH she was found to have 
haematological evidence of DIC, and had visible petechiae and 
haematomas. She was continued on mechanical ventilation because 
of a low Glasgow Coma Score and because she became progressively 
more hypotensive. A Swan-Ganz catheter (SGC) was inserted; the 
initial pulmonary artery occlusion pressure was 22 mmHg, and 
both the left ventricular stroke work index and calculated systemic 
vascular resistance were low and remained so throughout the illness. 
The SGC did not measure continuous cardiac output, and these 
parameters were measured only occasionally to minimise exposure 
to bodily fluids. The platelet count remained low despite transfusions, 
methlyprednisone, broad-spectrum antibiotics, gammaglobulin and 
a relook laparotomy, and the temperature failed to settle. On day 
23, she died from an intracranial haemorrhage. No antivirals or 
immune serum were utilised. Despite a strong antibody response 
and sustained improvement in liver enzymes, Ebola antigen was still 
detected in the blood up to day 20 and in the urine up to day 23.
Once a definitive diagnosis had been made, a search was 
undertaken for the source of the infection. The only possible 
candidate was a doctor who had been brought to SA on a commercial 
flight from Libreville, with a history of 8 days of fever and diarrhoea. 
The nursing sister, although wearing gloves, surgical gown and mask, 
had been exposed to a great deal of blood from this patient during 
and after placement of a central venous catheter. However, there 
were no reports of needlestick injury and she had no more exposure 
than those who placed the catheter or performed the gastroscopy or 
laparotomy on the Gabonese doctor at a later stage.
The Gabonese doctor, who had been discharged, was found to have 
highly positive serology for Ebola, and antigen was also recovered 
from a semen sample. Although he denied knowledge of an Ebola 
outbreak in Gabon, it was determined that he had treated a patient 
from Booué, the epicentre of the epidemic.[5]
Little was known about Ebola at the time, and even experts in the 
field were uncertain as to the mode of transmission. It was presumed 
usually to be via contact with body fluids, but airborne transmission 
was considered possible, as breathable 0.8 - 1.0 - 2.0 µm droplets 
had been documented to be highly infectious to rhesus monkeys 
exposed to the Reston and Zaire strains of Ebola virus in laboratory 
conditions.[7] This was the first time JH staff had managed a patient 
with EVD, and initially there was considerable consternation. High-
level barrier nursing was considered preferable and the patient was 
isolated, PPE was worn, and high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA)-
filtered respirators were used for invasive procedures. Case definitions 
were developed and distributed widely, as were definitions outlining 
what constituted significant exposure, and protocols were devised to 
optimise management.
Novel arenavirus, 2008
In 2008 an outbreak of an arenavirus infection similar to Lassa fever 
occurred.[8] The primary case was a travel consultant in Zambia who 
became ill with fever and sore throat. Rapid deterioration required 
her transfer from Zambia to a Johannesburg clinic on 12 September, 
where she died 2 days later with cerebral oedema and multiple organ 
dysfunction. On 22 September, patient 2, an emergency medical 
therapist who had accompanied the primary case between Zambia 
and SA, became ill and on 27 September was transferred to the same 
clinic, where he died on 2 October. Given the similarity of clinical 
presentation,[9] tests for VHF and other communicable diseases were 
performed, but were negative. Contact tracing was nevertheless 
initiated, which identified two further cases, a nursing sister and a 
cleaner, both of whom had been in contact with the primary patient. 
Both also tested negative for Lassa, CCHF, Marburg and Ebola viruses 
and had a rapid and fatal course. However, all four of these patients 
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were subsequently found to be PCR-positive for a new arenavirus 
that was named the Lujo virus. On 5 October, another nursing sister 
who had been involved in the care of patient 2 became ill with fever, 
leucopenia, thrombocytopenia and a rash and tested positive for the 
arenavirus.[9] This engendered considerable fear among all the staff, 
and in particular the nursing sister herself, who was a young mother. 
She was treated at the clinic at which she worked with assistance 
from the JH departments of Critical Care, Infectious Diseases and 
Infection Control. Oral ribavirin was initiated along with supportive 
therapy, but the hepatitis and thrombocytopenia worsened and 
she became confused. Consultations with international colleagues 
indicated that oral therapy was unlikely to achieve the minimum 
inhibitory concentrations necessary to eradicate the virus rapidly 
(personal communication, D G Bausch), so intravenous ribavirin was 
sourced from Valeant Pharmaceuticals (USA) in The Netherlands 
for the (iniquitous) price of USD45 000 for a 10-day course.[10] On 
initiation of this therapy there was prompt improvement, and the 
patient was subsequently discharged well.
It is not known how the two nursing sisters contracted the illness. 
All had used standard infection control procedures in the emergency 
department, including gown, gloves and surgical mask. It is possible 
that breaches occurred, because use of PPE is seldom sufficiently 
strictly supervised in the emergency room (ER), particularly prior 
to a definitive diagnosis being made. Neither reported needlestick 
injuries or contamination of open wounds with secretions. It is also 
not certain how the cleaner became ill; however, standard infection 
control procedures may not have been strictly followed, particularly 
if the cubicle was scrubbed down without use of gloves. This event 
emphasised the need for universal precautions for all patients 
admitted to the ER and ICU, regardless of the diagnosis.
Discussion
Many hospitals internationally are preparing for the management of 
patients with VHF, specifically because of the impact of the current 
Ebola outbreak. Many of these institutions have biosafety level 3 and 
4 laboratories and designated isolation areas that enable them to deal 
with these formidable viruses safely.[11,12]
However, there is no telling where a VHF might appear, as most 
patients unfortunately do not know which are the specific referral 
hospitals, and do not know or suspect their own diagnoses. We 
therefore recommend that all hospitals have some awareness of the 
VHFs and have PPE available in the emergency department in order 
to obviate the dreadful consequences of what is, in many cases, the 
unnecessary loss of a colleague. We acknowledge that epidemics such 
as those in West Africa transiently increase adherence to infection 
control procedures. Nevertheless, even once the panic has died down, 
regular reinforcement of standard precautions should be practised in 
all hospitals to avoid a tendency to complacency.[13]
Reduction of risk
A detailed travel history is mandatory for all patients presenting 
at any hospital, and if positive should include details of possible 
incubation periods and specific exposures.[14] Hospitals in areas of 
greatest risk should have a case definition that alerts frontline doctors 
to the possibility of a VHF, and this should be modified according to 
each outbreak. While these diseases are rare, they must be recognised 
as possible in any HCW or laboratory worker presenting with acute 
onset of documented fever (oral ≥38ºC or axillary ≥37.5ºC) and 
thrombocytopenia without any obvious alternative diagnosis, or in 
any patient with a history of travel to an area where these diseases 
are prevalent. Over 3 billion people travel by air annually, and as 
has recently been shown, any transmissible disease is but a few 
hours away. Whereas malaria is the most common diagnosis among 
travellers requiring hospitalisation for fever and thrombocytopenia, 
accounting for 27 - 42% of cases, this should not lead to a decrease in 
vigilance.[15,16] Personal protection has become increasingly important 
because of the risk of exposure to transmissible diseases such as HIV, 
tuberculosis, influenza, anthrax and measles.[17-19]
Preparation of hospitals
Following the 1996 Ebola scare, JH was designated as a referral centre, 
and recently a number of other hospitals around the country have 
been similarly designated despite minimal instruction and training 
in infection control techniques. HCWs most likely to be exposed 
should receive regular training in the use of high-level PPE and in the 
reduction of environmental contamination.[20-22] At JH, now Charlotte 
Maxeke Johannesburg Academic Hospital (CMJAH), ICU and ER staff 
had been familiarised with disease recognition and PPE on a regular 
basis, even before the current Ebola outbreak. Infection control staff 
at CMJAH are also always available to instruct staff in the event of an 
outbreak, and in an ongoing fashion, between outbreaks.
An isolation area has been created capable of managing three 
critically ill patients in separate cubicles with a negative-pressure 
environment, with monitors no longer in use in the main ICU. 
This facility is maintained by infection control personnel and is 
permanently stocked with PPE. Specific items have been added 
to reduce overall exposure in the ICU cubicles, such as plastic 
specimen and 24-hour urine containers, buckets with biocide in 
which instruments are soaked, rubbish-disposal boxes containing 
two red plastic bags, and X-ray, dialysis and ECG machines and a 
cardiac output monitor. Linen that has been condemned owing to 
wear is used and incinerated after use.
Specific infection control procedures have been established, and 
intensive education, particularly with regard to the donning and 
doffing of PPE, has been instituted; in the event of an outbreak, 24-hour 
supervision by infection control staff has been mandated. We believe 
this to be critical to management of these cases, and it was often not 
the case in Europe and the USA where transmission occurred. The 
education and supervision includes the safe performance of invasive 
procedures and protocols that must be followed when drawing and 
transporting laboratory specimens.
The stress of managing such cases requires reorganisation of staff 
schedules; in the CMJAH unit, four nursing staff at a time would work 
12-hour shifts, 3 hours on and 3 hours off. A record is kept of all contacts, 
and all staff are monitored with daily temperature and symptom charts. 
Baseline platelet count and transaminase values are obtained. Protocols 
have also been developed for collection and transport of specimens 
(only the most experienced laboratory staff process samples) and the 
efficient and safe management of waste. Similarly, procedures have been 
developed for the management of patients who die.
The World Health Organization and Centers for Disease Control 
guidelines with regard to PPE have until recently been somewhat 
contradictory, in that an N95 respirator has been advised for laboratory 
workers, whereas clinicians have been advised to use surgical masks. 
We believe this to be illogical, considering that the circumstances in 
which patients are managed are always more chaotic than those in the 
controlled laboratory environment, and as such (especially since the 
viruses are potentially lethal) an N95 mask as a minimum should be 
mandatory. It should be noted that there remains some uncertainty as 
to the modes of transmission of viruses such as Ebola, and that many 
of the procedures involved in management are aerosol generating.[23]
Ethics and personal liberties
An often neglected component of training relates to professional 
and ethical responsibilities, including responses to unjustified 
absenteeism and individual liberty and autonomy. While it may be 
compulsory to provide care for infected patients, HCWs still have 
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there is a remarkable commitment and sense of duty among staff 
who are involved. We find that regular training in infection control 
procedures creates a sense of reality that makes staff more likely to 
consider management of these patients as a routine event. This does 
not imply negligence, but rather a reduction in the ‘fear’ element 
often associated with lapses in infection control. It is critical also that 
staff designated to care for these possible VHF patients feel supported 
by the hospital administration and senior staff members, and that 
they are recognised for the sacrifices that they are called on to make.
In the management of multiple patients with a variety of VHFs in 
various Johannesburg hospitals, no doctor or nurse, or any member 
of the ancillary staff, has refused to care for the patients. This has been 
a reflection of the availability of appropriate PPE and the reassurance, 
leadership and support from clinical heads and infection control staff.
We hope that our experiences in somewhat resource-constrained 
environments may be of assistance to others faced with similar situations.
1. Gear JS, Cassel GA, Gear AJ, et al. Outbreak of Marburg virus disease in Johannesburg. BMJ
1975;4(5995):489-493.
2. Martini GA. Marburg agent disease in man. Trans R Soc Trop Med Hyg 1969;63(3):295-302.
3. Van Eeden PJ, Joubert JR, van de Wal BW. A nosocomial outbreak of Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic 
fever at Tygerberg Hospital: Part I. Clinical features. S Afr Med J 1985;68(10):711-717.
4. Centers for Disease Control Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever – Republic of South Africa. MMWR 
Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 1985;34(7):94, 99-101.
5. Georges AJ, Leroy EM, Renaud AA, et al. Ebola hemorrhagic fever outbreaks in Gabon, 1994-1997: 
Epidemiologic and health control issues. J Infect Dis 1999;179(Suppl 1):S65-S75.
6. Richards GA, Murphy S, Jobson R, et al. Unexpected Ebola virus in a tertiary setting: Clinical and 
epidemiologic aspects. Crit Care Med 2000;28(1):240-224.
7. Peters CJ, LeDuc LW. An Introduction to Ebola: The virus and the disease. J Infect Dis 1999;179(Suppl 
1):ix-xvi. [http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/514322]
8. Paweska JT, Sewlall NH, Ksiazek TG, et al. Nosocomial outbreak of novel arenavirus infection,
southern Africa. Emerg Infect Dis 2009;15(10):1598-1602. [http://dx.doi.org/10.3201/eid1510.090211]
9. Sewlall NH, Richards GA, Duse A, et al. PLoS Negl Trop Dis 2014;8:e3233. [http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/
journal.pntd.0003233]
10. Richards GA, Sewlall N, Duse A. Availability of drugs for formidable communicable diseases. Lancet 
Infect Dis 2009;373(9663):545-546. [http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(09)60202-6]
11. Risi GF, Bloom ME, Hoe NP, et al. Preparing a community hospital to manage work-related exposures 
to infectious agents in biosafety level 3 and 4 laboratories. Emerg Infect Dis 2010;16(3):373-378.
[http://dx.doi.org/10.3201/eid1603.091485]
12. Kortepeter MG, Martin JW, Rusnak JM, et al. Managing potential laboratory exposure to Ebola virus 
by using a patient biocontainment care unit. Emerg Infect Dis 2008;14(6):881-887. [http://dx.doi.
org/10.3201/eid1406.071489]
13. Randle J, Arthur A, Vaughan N. Twenty-four-hour observational study of hospital hand hygiene
compliance. J Hosp Infect 2010;76(3):252-255. [http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jhin.2010.06.027]
14. Ryan ET, Wilson ME, Kain KC. Illness after international travel. N Engl J Med 2002;347(7):505-516. 
[http://dx.doi.org/10.1056/NEJMra020118]
15. O’Brien D, Tobin S, Brown GB, Torresi J. Fever in returned travelers: Review of hospital admissions for 
a 2-year period. Clin Infect Dis 2001;33(5):603-609. [http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/322602]
16. Doherty JF, Grant AD, Bryceson AD. Fever as the presenting complaint of travellers returning from the 
tropics. QJM 1995;88(4):277-281.
17. Sprung CL, Zimmerman JL, Christian MD, et al. Recommendations for intensive care unit and hospital 
preparations for an influenza epidemic or mass disaster: Summary report of the European Society of 
Intensive Care Medicine’s Task Force for intensive care unit triage during an influenza epidemic or 
mass disaster. Intensive Care Med 2010;36(3):428-443. [http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00134-010-1759-y]
18. Brouqui P, Puro V, Fusco FM, et al., for the EUNID Working Group. Infection control in the management 
of highly pathogenic infectious diseases: Consensus of the European Network of Infectious Disease. 
Lancet Infect Dis 2009;9(5):301-311. [http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S1473-3099(09)70070-2]
19. Wang C, Weia S, Xianga H, et al. Evaluating the effectiveness of an emergency preparedness training 
programme for public health staff in China. Public Health 2008;122(5):471-477. [http://dx.doi.
org/10.1016/j.puhe.2007.08.006]
20. Richards GA, Sprung CL. Educational process: Recommendations and standard operating procedures 
for intensive care unit and hospital preparations for an influenza epidemic or mass disaster. Intensive 
Care Med 2010;36(Suppl 1):S70-S79. [http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00134-010-1768-x]
21. Lau J, Fung K, Wong T, et al. SARS transmission among hospital workers in Hong Kong. Emerg Infect 
Dis 2004;10(2):280-286. [http://dx.doi.org/10.3201/eid1002.030534]
22. Rebmann T, English JF, Carrico R. Disaster preparedness lessons learned and future directions for 
education: Results from focus groups conducted at the 2006 APIC conference. Am J Infect Control 
2007;35(6):374-381. [http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ajic.2006.09.002]
23. MacIntyre CR, Chughtai AA, Seale H, Richards GA, Davidson PM. Respiratory protection for
healthcare workers treating Ebola virus disease (EVD): Are facemasks sufficient to meet occupational 
health and safety obligations? Int J Nurs Stud 2014;51(11):1421-1426. [http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.
ijnurstu.2014.09.002]
24. Thompson AK, Faith K, Gibson JL, Upshur REG. Pandemic influenza preparedness: An ethical framework to guide 
decision-making. BMC Med Ethics 2006;7:12 PMID:17144926. [http://dx.doi.org/10.1186/1472-6939-7-12]
Accepted 30 June 2015.
